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Abstract. 
Objective: the paper focuses on attempts to show, first of all, the potential capacity of the meaning of the 
“punishment” concept as enshrined by law, by way of construing certain philosophical categories such as 
nature, meaning, form, purpose and clarifying the functions thereof within the scope of the “punishment” 
concept definition; to establish characteristic features and peculiarities of punishment which actually prede-
termine the substance of such criminal law institution; and, thus, to shed a clearer light onto how and to 
what extent punishment may influence on the crime rate reduction. Results: the existing scientific approach-
es to definition of nature and meaning of the “punishment” concept have been analysed, and there has been 
also shown their interrelation with the notions of purpose and function of punishment. There has also been 
stated that the problem in question is impossible to explore without having construed the philosophical cate-
gories of nature, meaning, form, and purpose in attempt to define the notion of punishment. The focus has 
been placed on the necessity to directly address the philosophical categories in order to understand the na-
ture and meaning of punishment, since any legal phenomenon comprises its own peculiar specific features 
and can be elucidated only either by means or with the help thereof. Discussion: there are reasonable 
grounds to claim that the nature of punishment is not identical to such notions as “meaning”, “form”, “pur-
pose”, and “function”. It shall be defined largely by the essence of those aims that government attempts to 
achieve when applying this specific type of social relations regulator. Meaning specifies the nature of pun-
ishment. It has been noted that future research prospects on this issue are feasible if the focus is placed on 
elaboration of contemporary approaches and characteristics of such fundamental categories of legal science 
as nature, meaning, form, functions, and purpose of punishment. 
Keywords: punishment, nature, meaning, purpose, penalty, crime prevention. 
 
Problem statement and topicality. No matter 
how successfully our society is getting better, all in-
tentions and actions will get delusive unless we 
stop a rapid growth in all indices of crime. Punish-
ment is given a peculiar role in this regard, as it is 
the gravest measure among all those pertaining to 
official enforcement and applied solely for com-
mitment of severe, socially dangerous acts, crimes.  
For centuries, such categories as “crime”, “pun-
ishment”, and “crime prevention” have been re-
ferred to those deemed to have prime importance, 
to be multifaceted, interrelated and interdependent 
entities. Meanwhile, the fact that nowadays there is 
still an ongoing polemic over approaches to defini-
tion of the nature and meaning of punishment, its 
main functions, and the purpose thereof predeter-
mines the topicality of the issue. In particular, what 
is a penalty for the crime committed? To what ex-
tent of application thereof shall a penalty be 
deemed adequate to the crime committed? Shall the 
question of correction of convicted persons be in-
cluded into the purpose of punishment? These and 
other questions, as it appears herefrom, are impos-
sible to solve without the knowledge of philosopho-
legal categories. At the same time, it should be not-
ed that punishment has always been a necessary 
and important instrument of public response to the 
crimes committed and to the persons who have 
committed them, and is still one of the most wide-
Денисова Т. А. 
Юридичний вісник 1 (46) 2018 159 
spread forms of exercising criminal responsibility. 
The factual material accumulated and the results of 
thorough understanding of the notion require new 
approaches that would be premised on contempo-
rary scientific achievements in the field of criminal 
and penal law. Moreover, from this moment on, ir-
respective of scientific legacy, peculiarities of soci-
opolitical form of government, system and princi-
ples of functioning of criminal justice, the attention 
to and the interest in multiple punishment-related 
issues will not fade away. 
Study results review. As a theoretical back-
ground to solve the tasks set herein, there have been 
analysed the works of the following well-known 
scientists: Yu. Antonian, M. Bazhanov, L. Bahrii-
Shakhmatov, Yu. Baulin, M. Hernet, O. Hertzenzon, 
V. Hryschuk, V. Duiunov, A. Zakaliuk, I. Karpets, 
O. Kostenko, M. Korzhanskyi, N. Christie, 
N. Kuznietsova, P. Matyshevskyi, M. Melentiiev, 
P. Mykhailenka, O. Mikhlina, A. Piontkovskyi, 
S. Poznyshev, H. Radov, V. Stashys, А. Степанюка, 
Ye. Strieltsov, M. Struchkov, M. Tahantsev, 
I. Foinytskyi, M. Sharhorodskyi, I. Shmarov, 
S. Yatsenko and others, who have expressed their 
seminal viewpoints onto the problem of punish-
ment, its nature, meaning, and purpose. However, 
notwithstanding a large number of works establish-
ing and solving the punishment issues, the interest 
in this or that aspect of the nature and meaning of 
punishment, purpose and functions thereof has not 
declined. It should be pointed that the objective and 
tasks of a contemporary research shall be set, with 
theoretical assumptions on the punishment nature 
and consequences thereof, laid down in the works 
of C. Beccaria, J. Bentham, G. Hegel, O. Kistiakivskyi, 
O. Leist, F. Liszt, Ch. Montesquieu, M. Tahantsev, 
G. Tarde, L. Feuerbach, Ad. Frank, taken into ac-
count. 
Objective statement. The article aims at show-
ing, in the first place, the capacity of meaning of 
the “punishment” notion as enshrined by law, 
through construing of certain philosophical catego-
ries, in particular, nature, meaning, form, purpose 
and by clarifying their functions; establishing those 
features and peculiarities of punishment that actual-
ly predetermine the essence of this institution of 
criminal law; and revealing how and to what extent 
punishment has its influence in terms of crime rate 
reduction.  
Statement of basic materials. As a historically 
predetermined enforcement measure applied by a 
court on behalf of government to a person convict-
ed of an offence capable to bear criminal responsi-
bility under the law, punishment has always meant 
restriction or deprivation of such person’s certain 
rights and liberties envisaged by law, excluding the 
purpose of corporal hurt or violation of human dig-
nity. It emerged as a form of government response 
to infringement of the rules set thereby as a certain 
kind of protection of society against crimes, which 
traditionally performs not only a punitive role but 
also a psychological and educational impact on a 
certain convicted person, its environment, certain 
population groups with unstable or offending be-
havior. Punishment is also an instrument to manage 
the process of social re-adaptation to the social life 
conditions.  
The analysis of the problems of the criminal law 
history of our State, namely, the issues of crime and 
punishment, have both a theoretical and an im-
portant practical value. This is particularly signifi-
cant, when the question is to define these notions in 
the light of philosophical and legal understanding. 
As general scientific concepts, the philosophical 
categories may be applied in all institutions and 
branches of legal science, however, the essential 
nature of application thereof in the conceptual 
framework of criminal legal science lies in the ne-
cessity to specify the marginally abstract meaning 
of the terms employed in the field of criminal law. 
It is necessary, therefore, for the purpose of cogni-
tion of the nature and meaning of the notion of pun-
ishment, to address the philosophical categories be-
cause each legal phenomenon, with the features 
specifically inherent thereto, can be shown with the 
help thereof only.  
A modern dictionary of philosophy defines na-
ture as a set of characteristics and features of an ob-
ject (phenomenon) which are in constant interrela-
tion. Nature as a dialectic category is a reflection of 
regularities typical for a phenomenon. Nature is not 
self-explanatory, and we cannot perceive it directly 
as a set of properties and characteristics; we can on-
ly discover it gradually. If we perceive a phenome-
non directly according to its certain features, then 
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the nature can be understood only due to deep ab-
stractions and generalizations [1, p.193; 2, p. 64; 3, 
p. 252].  
Meaning is a set of all the elements and process-
es creating an object or a phenomenon and both 
their internal interaction and interaction with envi-
ronment, which are predetermined by peculiar 
character of such object or phenomenon. Within the 
meaning of legal phenomena their nature continues, 
manifests, shows itself and becomes more specific 
[4, с. 631; 5, с. 219]. Form of a phenomenon is a 
structure, external boundaries of the phenomenon. 
It is closely connected with meaning and is fully 
dependent on it [4, p. 779]. In terms of philosopho-
legal science, function is an activity (carrying out, 
exercising) in the framework of certain system to 
which it pertains [2, p. 190; 6, p. 168, 437].  
It follows herefrom that nature and meaning of 
punishment are always in conjunction with each 
other. Nature necessarily preconditions the typical 
features, properties, and meaning in general, 
whereas functions are conversion of objective pos-
sibilities of this or that type of punishment in organ-
ization of social relations and connections arising in 
the process of awarding and enforcement of crimi-
nal punishments into a reality.  
Criminal punishment will always be both a 
means of protection of society against criminal in-
fringements and a means of crime prevention. I. 
Foinytskyi named criminal punishment to be a so-
cial self-protection measure [7, p. 67]. This mani-
fests the general nature of punishments and deter-
mines their main functions, with the safeguard 
function being one of them and playing a special 
role in combatting criminality. Therefore, one of 
the most presently topical tasks of the criminal le-
gal science is to develop a correct definition to na-
ture of punishment and to formulate the purposes, 
functions, system of punishment and activity of the 
punishment enforcement bodies and institutions on 
the basis thereof. 
Contemporary developments of the criminal le-
gal science show significant growth of this branch 
of legal science, bringing special value for both 
theoretical and practical types of activity. Neverthe-
less, it is still necessary to specify and subject to 
further theoretical elaboration a number of the 
terms used. In particular, prior to defining the no-
tion of punishment it is essential to establish its 
main features. Is it possible to admit a penalty as a 
key and generic term for punishment? What is pun-
ishment? Is it enforcement or violence? As it ap-
pears herefrom, each definition reveals a specific 
aspect of punishment and has a right of existence. 
However, prior to deciding on the nature of crimi-
nal punishment, it is necessary to undertake an 
analysis of respective scientific definition. It is 
clear that it is impossible to lay down the scientists’ 
opinions within the framework of one article, but 
some considerations in this respect claim attention 
in any way.  
The majority of scientists of criminal and penal 
law have emphasized that punishment is a penalty 
in itself. Thus, for example, in the opinions of 
M. Biliaiev [8, p. 64], A. Naumov [9, p. 361], 
S. Poznyshev [10, p. 3-31], punishment shall be a 
penalty for a crime committed, which must com-
prise certain restrictions and sufferings. Moreover, 
punishment shall be a preventive measure that dis-
courages commitment of new crimes [11, p. 6-8]. 
N. Christie, vice versa, thinks that criminal pun-
ishment is excessive because crime is a society’s 
disease that cannot be cured by means of reprisal 
[12, p. 11]. Along with other researchers, he sug-
gests applying alternative measures to imprison-
ment as wide as possible [13, p. 22], and, in par-
ticular cases, – relying on preventive measures in 
the family education domain [14, p. 580]. At same 
time, when it comes to the question of adequacy 
and purpose of punishment, the option to apply im-
prisonment shall not be negated either [15].  
In the legislative domain, the notion of punish-
ment has also passed through its thorny path of 
transformations. The operative CC of Ukraine, in 
Part 1 of Article 50 “Definition and Purpose of 
Punishment” states: “Punishment is an enforcement 
measure applied on behalf of government under a 
sentence of a court to a person found guilty for 
commitment of a crime, which entails restriction of 
the rights and liberties of a convicted person as set 
forth by the law”, i.e. a legislator employed the no-
tion of “a penalty” as a purpose of criminal pun-
ishment [16]. This viewpoint, in L. Kruhlikov’s 
opinion, is a tribute to past, on the one hand (with 
regard to “Punishment aims not only at penalizing 
…”), and on the other, – it is incorrect because of a 
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belief that it is impossible to recognize penalty 
simultaneously both as nature and purpose of a 
punishment. As the author thinks about, by penalty 
as the purpose of punishment, the Ukrainian legis-
lators meant restoration of social justice [17, p.70-
73]. By the way, although the purpose of restora-
tion of social justice has been enshrined in the crim-
inal codes of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of 
Moldova, the Russian Federation and the Republic 
of Tadjikistan, one cannot fully agree with L. Kruh-
likov’s considerations. This comes in response to 
that the notion of justice is a category of a moral 
and socio-legal nature, which penetrates into all 
spheres of social relations. It comprises evaluation 
of these or those phenomena, whether they contain 
right and wrong, lawfulness and lawlessness. Jus-
tice has evaluative nature. It defies understanding 
and finding means for achievement thereof, and es-
tablishing the indices of efficiency thereof. That is 
why it appears perfectly true that national legisla-
tors and scientists have left the purpose of “restora-
tion of social justice” external to the law and de-
clared it only as a principle. In this respect, it would 
be viable to uphold the view of an outstanding sci-
entist M. Bazhanov, who defined punishment as: 
“… this is a peculiar enforcement measure applica-
ble pursuant to criminal law for commitment of a 
crime” [18, p. 315]. This thesis has been supported 
by other scientists as well, namely by V. Borysov, 
N. Hutorova, M. Panov, V. Tiutiuhin, Ye. Streltsov, 
etc.  
V. Hruschuk, by commenting the provision of 
Article 50 of CC of Ukraine refers “penalty” to the 
meaning of punishment: “The meaning of punish-
ment is a penalty which lies in deprivation or re-
striction of rights and liberties of a person convict-
ed for commitment of a crime” [19, p. 129].  
V. Lomako carried out a sufficiently complete 
criminal and legal analysis of the provision of Arti-
cle 50 of CC of Ukraine. He emphasized correctly 
that punishment will attain aims only due to its in-
evitability, and, along with other scientists, he ana-
lysed the features of criminal punishment. Getting 
closer to the restriction of rights and liberties of a 
convicted person set out in the law, viewed as a 
punishment feature, V. Lomako insists on penalty 
to be a property of any criminal punishment. At the 
same time, what a legislator deems to be a purpose 
of punishment, penalty, he explains in the following 
way: “Admitting penalty as a purpose of punish-
ment does not reduce penalty as an essential prop-
erty (feature) of any punishment. Penalty manifests 
in two capacities which are being in dialectical uni-
ty...” [20, p. 189-190; 21, p. 356-367]. 
In order to get a more comprehensive under-
standing of existing approaches to definition of 
punishment, its essence, meaning, and purpose, 
there have been analysed the norms on this question 
which a number of criminal codes of the ex-USSR 
countries and Baltic states contain. It develops that 
until now the legislators of different countries have 
ambiguously solved the question of nature, mean-
ing, and purpose of punishment, and these issues 
are rather polemical.  
As appears, the definitions of “punishment and 
“penalty” are very close in its meaning but not 
identical ones. As it has been stated earlier, nature 
represents typical features, properties of a phenom-
enon, whereas it is within the scope of meaning 
where their nature continues, manifests, and speci-
fies, exactly in the way as if “punitiveness” was al-
ways a nature, an internal essence of a penalty. This 
is so because due to it a convicted person is de-
prived of certain advantages, suffers certain re-
striction of his or her rights and liberties, and what 
is more – government enforces him or her to fulfil 
certain obligations. This was emphasized by 
M. Bazhanov, M. Korzhanskyi, P.Matyshevskyi, 
P. Mykhailenko Y. Noi, M. Struchkov, etc.  
Another problem refers to the meaning of pun-
ishment. In their attempt to reveal the meaning of 
the main features of punishment, the scientists have 
not been specific about their number. Thus, for in-
stance, M. Bazhanov has singled out six punish-
ment features, among which punishment is “a spe-
cial measure of state enforcement”, whereas 
M. Sharhorodskyi suggests seven features alike. 
Notwithstanding discrepancies within the ap-
proaches to define essential punishment features, 
the general principle of a punitive activity remains 
constant – to make the persons guilty in commit-
ment of a crime behave in a law-abiding manner. 
Punishment, in its nature, may objectively inflict 
corporal or moral hurt to a convicted person; how-
ever, such violence shall be deemed lawful. It may 
not be combined with harassment, physical mis-
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treatment, abasement of human dignity, etc. This is 
because otherwise the punishment would become 
an act of cruelty and evil intent as if it existed ipso 
facto, as something which was groundless, baseless, 
and unlawful being directed against social morality. 
Government, vice versa, addresses an offender, to 
his or her personality, with demands: to change, by 
effort of will, his or her behaviour to the law-
abiding one. Punishment does not negate positive 
qualities of a person who has committed an offence 
but only attempts to make him or her act positively 
in future and not violate the law. Enforcement may 
be both physical and mental and shall be exercised 
under conditions of serving punishment. It is in the 
regime, as essence of a penalty, the relevant set of 
rules containing restrictions and deprivations ap-
plied to a convicted person (physical isolation from 
the society; physical, moral, property restrictions, 
procedure and conditions of punishment, etc.) shall 
be imposed. 
It should be emphasized that by virtue of the na-
ture and meaning of punishment only we can estab-
lish its ultimate purposes, which government tends 
to achieve so much when it imposes criminal re-
sponsibility, convicts a guilty one to this or that pe-
nal measure and to exercising thereof. 
As far as the purpose of punishment is con-
cerned, V. Hryschuk has aptly noted that it “mani-
fests” in four domains: 1) penalising of a convicted 
person – imprisonment or restriction of his or her 
rights and liberties; 2) correction of a convicted 
person; 3) preventing a convicted person from 
committing of a new offence; 4) preventing other 
persons from committing crimes. The statement 
that penalty is always exercised when punishment 
applies is quite essential. It is important it should 
comply with the principle of justice [19, p. 129].  
When analysing the nature and meaning of pun-
ishment, touching upon the problem of defining its 
purpose, it should be noted that correction of a con-
victed person as well as general and special preven-
tion have been subsumed under the purposes of 
punishment with a penalty inclusively. All the pur-
poses of punishment, despite their relative autono-
my, are closely interconnected. Nevertheless, this 
dialectical unity does not exclude changes in this or 
that period and a priority of one purpose over an-
other. These changes may be conditioned by the 
state of criminality, trends in criminal policy and 
legislation, and by the changes in social and eco-
nomic life of society. In the field of criminal and 
penal law, the purposes coincide at large and close-
ly intertwine. However, the ultimate result in crimi-
nal and executive legislation presupposes not only a 
corrected person but also his or her social rehabili-
tation. This may be traced because the majority of 
the norms of CEC of Ukraine are directed particu-
larly to achievement of purpose of resocialization 
and adaptation of an ex-offender to normal condi-
tions of the life in society. Unfortunately, not al-
ways can this purpose be achieved. Although pun-
ishment performs its positive role in crime preven-
tion, it should be applied very carefully. This is be-
cause punishment as a public enforcement measure 
has its own functions. It is, primarily, the punitive 
function, that entails certain sufferings, restrictions, 
and other features of personal and property nature. 
The guarding function means the type of punish-
ment, location for execution thereof, and security 
restrictions. The educational function is connected, 
mainly, with social neglect of a person who is a 
subject of educational influence. The social role of 
the guarding function of punishment manifests in 
that it is an important element of the overall system 
of social crime prevention, in general, and recidi-
vism prevention, in particular. It should be noted 
that accentuation on the stated functions of punish-
ment becomes possible only due to establishment of 
the nature and meaning of criminal punishment. 
Conclusions. To sum up it is necessary to point 
that new conditions of existence of our society do 
not exclude but require applying philosopho-legal 
categories when defining and studying certain no-
tions. Punishment shall be one of them. There is 
satisfactory proof that nature of punishment is not 
identical to the notions “meaning”, “form”, “pur-
pose”, and “function”. It shall be predetermined 
largely by the scope of meaning of those purposes 
that government aims to achieve by applying this 
specific regulator of social relations, and the mean-
ing specifies the nature of punishment.  
Therefore, when commenting on the institution 
of punishment, it is necessary to use mainly, or 
even exclusively, the formulas of the annotated 
norms. Otherwise, there may arise undesirable de-
viation in construing the legal norms in the process 
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of application thereof. All the above said also 
points to an urgent need in further development of 
such fundamental categories of the legal science as 
nature, meaning, form, functions, and purpose of 
punishment. 
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ЯК ФІЛОСОФСЬКО-ПРАВОВІ КАТЕГОРІЇ 
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Мета: за допомогою тлумачення деяких філософських категорій, а саме сутності, змісту, фор-
ми, мети та з’ясування їх функцій у визначенні поняття покарання показати, перш за все, можливо-
сті, закладені законом у сам зміст поняття «покарання», визначити ознаки, особливості покарання, 
що фактично визначають сутність цього інституту кримінального права та розкрити, яким чином 
і в якому обсязі покарання впливає на зменшення рівня злочинності. Результати: проаналізовано на-
укові підходи до визначення сутності та змісту покарання та показано зв’язок цих категорій з по-
няттями мети та функції покарання. Акцентовано увагу на тому, що для пізнання сутності та змі-
сту поняття покарання у кримінально-правовій площині, необхідно звернення до філософських кате-
горій. Обговорення: наголошено, що лише за допомогою філософсько-правових визначень може бути 
розкрито кожне правове явище, якому притаманні специфічні ознаки.  
Ключові слова: покарання, сутність, зміст, мета, кара, запобігання злочинам. 
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Цель: с помощью толкования некоторых философских категорий, а именно сущности, содержа-
ния, формы, цели и выяснения их функций в определении понятия наказания показать, прежде всего, 
возможности, заложенные законом в само содержание понятия «наказание», определить признаки, 
особенности наказания, фактически определяющие сущность этого института уголовного права и 
раскрыть, каким образом и в каком объеме наказания влияет на уменьшение уровня преступности. 
Результаты: проанализированы научные подходы к определению сущности и содержания наказания 
и показана связь этих категорий с понятиями цели и функции наказания. Акцентировано внимание 
на том, что для познания сущности и содержания понятия наказания в уголовно-правовой плоско-
сти, необходимо обращение к философским категориям. Обсуждение: отмечено, что только с по-
мощью философско-правовых определений может быть раскрыто каждое правовое явление, кото-
рому присущи специфические признаки. 
Ключевые слова: наказание, сущность, содержание, цель, наказание, предотвращение преступ-
лений. 
 
